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I. Introduction
A revival of interest in the "resource based view of the firm" has led to renewed interest in heterogeneous organizational capability as a source of competitive advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Dosi and Teece, 1993; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Mitchell, 1992; . Theoretical work in the area has established that in order to be an enduring source of competitive advantage, "competencies" must be both difficult to acquire through routine market transactions and very hard to replicate, and researchers have focused attention on assets such as patents, established brand names, distribution systems, and production capabilities as potential sources of heterogeneous capability and competitive advantage as a result (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Rumelt, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) .
In complementary work several scholars have suggested that organizational knowledge, structure, culture or "capabilities" may also be a unique source of advantage (Burgelman, 1994; Leonard-Barton; Nelson, 1991; Teece and Pisano, 1994) . This research has focused attention on the importance of a variety of organizational mechanisms, including an organization's ability to coordinate specialized units (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) , organizational culture (Leonard-Barton, 1992) , information filters and communication channels (Arrow, 1974) , and search routines and procedures (Nelson and Winter, 1992) as key determinants of organizational performance. Research in the tradition of Cyert and March (1963) is also consistent with this perspective in believing that the control of information within the firm and the structuring of organizational attention are critically important organizational characteristics (March, 1991) .
A series of detailed empirical studies has further focused attention on the pivotal role of the effective integration of knowledge in shaping competitive advantage. In several industries firms that have invested in boundary spanning mechanisms such as "heavy weight product teams," (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) , the use of a "system focused approach" (Iansiti, 1993) , or in processes that integrate customer needs and preferences more tightly into the product development process (Von Hippel, 1994) , have significantly outperformed those that have not. Similarly studies of low performing firms in a number of industries experiencing rapid technological change suggest that a reliance on tacit, deeply embedded knowledge as an integrative mechanism may create serious competitive problems (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen 1993 ). Iansiti and Clark (1994) have christened these skills "dynamic capabilities" and their importance has been documented in a variety of other industries (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tabrizi and Eisenhardt, 1994) .
While this research is an exciting first step towards making the idea of "organizational capability" empirically concrete, it leaves a number of questions unanswered. In the first place, the bulk of this work has been conducted in mechanical assembled products industries -industries such as medical equipment, disk drives, mainframe computers, automobiles and semiconductor capital equipment. We know much less about the role of integrative mechanisms and their potential as a source of "competence" in cases in which the base technology has quite different characteristics or in which the institutional structure of the industry is quite different. This is an important issue given the accumulating evidence that institutional context is an important determinant of the nature of competition between firms (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Francis, 1992; Hirsch, 1975) .
In the second place, the empirical work in this area has in general not focused explicitly on the source of these kinds of organizational capabilities (See Burgelman, 1994, for an important exception to this generalization). Several of the empirical researchers have drawn normative conclusions from their findings and recommended the adoption of the kinds of mechanisms that they have described as a route to improved performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) . But the derivation of normative recommendations in this way raises an important question: if these kinds of capabilities can be easily adopted, why are they plausible sources of competitive advantage?
This question is further complicated by the fact that theoretical work in this area is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand the work of the population ecologists is founded on the idea that organizational capabilities are quite resistant to change (Hannen and Freeman, 1989) , while on the other hand some economists have rejected the idea that organizational capabilities of this type could be an enduring source of competitive advantage on the grounds that they can be easily replicated (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989) . The work of the evolutionary theorists Nelson and Winter, 1982) has staked out a theoretically plausible middle ground, and recent research in the neoclassical tradition also suggests that the acquisition of competitively significant competencies may be a slow and uncertain process (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) . But although several detailed historical studies have explored the evolution of organizational competence (Cusumano, 1993; Graham and Pruitt, 1990) , there have been few systematic cross sectional empirical studies that speak to this issue. Data limitations have forced many studies either to such an aggregate level that any possible evolution of capabilities is hidden, or to cross sectional work in which the dynamics of competition cannot be explored in as much detail as one might like (Cool and Schendel, 1988; Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988) .
Building a better understanding of this issue is critically important to the task of developing a better understanding of the nature and strategic importance of "capabilities" or "competencies" in general. While the concept of "integrative" or "dynamic" capability is clearly important, we need to know much more about the degree to which tools such as "heavy weight teams" are dependent for their significance on the context or structure of particular industries or technologies. Similarly we need to know much more about the degree to which the development of a particular competence is a matter of managerial choice. If competencies evolve over time in response to forces that are not well understood by senior management they may well be an important source of competitive advantage -but they may not be an appropriate subject for the generation of normative prescriptions. This paper explores these issues through a study of the evolution of integrative competence as a factor in productive pharmaceutical research. The industry provides a particularly interesting context in which to investigate these questions since the industry is significantly different from the mechanical assembled products industries that have been the focus of much previous research. It's "product" is a single molecule, manufacturing capability has historically not been a critical source of competitive advantage, and, perhaps most intriguingly of all, despite an accelerating rate of change in the industry's core technologies, some of the firms founded in the forties and fifties have been able to maintain a record of successful innovation.
The paper begins with an outline of the methodology of the study on which the results are based. In a companion paper, "Measuring Competence? Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry" Iain Cockburn and I used the quantitative data collected through the study to test the hypotheses that two types of integrative capability are fundamental to effective drug discovery: externally focused integrative competence, or the ability to move information rapidly across the boundaries of the firm and internally focused integrative competence, or the ability to exchange information effectively across the boundaries of scientific disciplines and therapeutic areas within the firm. We showed that quantitative variables designed to capture these effects between them accounted for roughly 25% of the variance in research productivity across firms and for as much as 7% of the variance in research productivity across programs in cross sectional data from the period 1975-1990.1 But while these results are suggestive, and the majority of the firms in our sample found them extremely plausible, they do not answer the critical question of just why it is that such seemingly straightforward mechanisms should be an enduring source of advantage.
In this paper I draw on detailed qualitative evidence to explore the ways in which these integrative competencies have developed over time. The next section summarizes the results of "Measuring Competence" as a prelude to a discussion of the evolution of pharmaceutical research technology over the last thirty years. I suggest that in the early days of the industry integrative capabilities were only tangentially related to success. As the industry has moved from so called "random" drug discovery to more "rational" or guided methods of search, their importance has greatly increased.
In Section 3 I describe the responses of three companies faced with this transition.
Company Alpha adopted more "rational" modes of drug discovery very early, and has been quite successful in developing integrative capabilities. Company Beta made a significant* commitment to rational drug design in the late seventies, but it took them almost ten years to develop the necessary organizational skills. My third case study, Company Gamma, was initially extremely successful in its efforts to discover drugs through "random" screening, and
At the program level roughly 9% of the variance in research productivity across programs could be explained by investment in the program and the size of the firm, 29% by the firm's choice of research strategy as captured by the choice of research programs and the scope of the research portfolio, and approximately 20% by the lagged dependent variable, which we interpret as a partial measure of the firm's domain specific knowledge in a particular program (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) . partially as a result by 1989 some areas of the company had still not completely made the transition to the new mode of research. The paper closes with a discussion the implications of these histories for our understanding of "integrative competence" and of possible directions for future research.
II. Integrative Competence in Pharmaceutical Research
In order to explore these issues I rely on both qualitative and quantitative data drawn from a larger study of research productivity in the pharmaceutical industry. Full details of the data and of the study's methodology are given in the Appendix and in our paper "Measuring Competence? Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry," (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) . In this paper we showed that five dummy variables were correlated with higher productivity: We interpreted PROPUB as a measure of the firm's ability to integrate knowledge across the boundaries of the organization and TEAM, FUNC, DICTATOR and ROW as measures of the firms' ability to integrate knowledge inside the firm. Our results thus suggested that the more successful firms maintained a rich flow of information across the boundaries of the firm by promoting key scientists on the basis of their publication records and of their standing in the wide scientific community, and that they maintained a high level of information flow across the boundaries of scientific disciplines and therapeutic areas within the firm by organizing research by therapeutic area or by using cross disciplinary teams, by managing world wide research through a single organization and by allocating resources by committee, rather than by using single individuals ("Dictators") to make the key decisions. These results are consistent with those obtained by other researchers who have looked at this industry (Gambardella, 1992; Koenig, 1975) , and we interpreted them as evidence that integrative capabilities were a critical constituent of success in pharmaceutical research, but they left unanswered the critical question raised at the beginning of this paper.
If such apparently straightforward organizational changes have such substantial implications for productivity, why are they not instantaneously adopted throughout the industry? In general the firms in our sample were not surprised by the results of "Measuring Core
Competence?" They readily agreed that actively encouraging the integration of their researchers into the larger community, encouraging publication, using cross functional teams and stimulating a rich conversation across therapeutic classes was critical to productive research, and with a few exceptions they were all actively moving to acquire these capabilities. Why should some of them find it so difficult?
Some part of the answer to this question probably lies in the evolution of the technology of pharmaceutical research. Pharmaceutical research takes place in two stages: drug discovery and drug development. The goal of the drug discovery process is to find a chemical compound that has a desirable effect in a "screen" that mimics some aspect of a disease state in man. The goal of the drug development process is to translate promising compounds into drugs that are safe and effective in humans. In order to limit the scope of the discussion here and in "Measuring Competence?" we focus on the process of drug discovery: future work will explore the organization of knowledge in drug development.
In the early days drug discovery was largely "random", or a matter of the large scale screening of thousands of compounds. For example researchers injected compounds into hypertensive rats or dogs to explore the degree to which they reduced blood pressure. New drugs were discovered both by screening naturally occurring compounds and by synthesizing wholly new compounds. Once something promising had been discovered synthetic chemists would synthesize large numbers of related compounds for further testing, since a compound that had a desirable effects in a screen was often not ideally suited to be a drug. It might have had unacceptable side effects, for example, or have been very difficult to administer. In general the "mechanism of action" of most drugs -the specific biochemical and molecular pathways that were responsible for their therapeutic effect -were not well understood.
Under this regime, successful drug discovery drew on three core disciplines: 
mI. Results: The Evolution of Competence
Given this transition, in general the firms in our sample were not surprised by the results of "Measuring Core Competence?" They readily agreed that actively encouraging the III integration of their researchers into the larger community, encouraging publication, using cross functional teams and stimulating a rich conversation across therapeutic classes was critical to productive research, and with a few exceptions they were all attempting to acquire these capabilities.
In order to gain some insight into why, despite their apparent simplicity, several of the firms in the sample found the process of acquiring these capabilities quite difficult, I
focus here on the history of hypertensive research within three firms: Alpha, Beta and Gamma. As a focus to the discussion I concentrate particularly on each company's reaction to Squibb's announcement of the synthesis of captopril. Captopril has entered pharmaceutical industry legend as the first drug to be created by purely "rational" design since Drs Cushman and Ondetti used their knowledge of the problem to hypothesize on paper structural changes that might lead to improvements in the "lead" compound, and a relatively small number of these changes led them quickly to a breakthrough that was widely interpreted as a vindication of the new approach (Cushman et al., 1977) .
All three companies developed healthy businesses following the second war, but in the next thirty years they all took very different paths. All three searched for cardiovascular therapies in general and hypertensive drugs in particular. All three had occasion to explore the renin angiotensive cascade and all three actively searched for new vasodilators, diuretics and beta-blockers. But when Cushman and Ondetti's classic paper was published the three reacted very differently.
Throughout the sixties and seventies Alpha had built close ties to the academic and clinical communities, priding itself on hiring the very best scientists and on harnessing them effectively to the discovery and development of new drugs. It moved early to exploit mechanism based methods of drug discovery, and when the synthesis of Captopril was announced was able to exploit the discovery rapidly. It is now one of the more successful firms in the industry.
At Beta the announcement contributed to a growing sense of crisis, ultimately triggering a major reorganization and a new dedication to mechanism based work. Although
Beta is now a major player in hypertensive research the transition was a difficult one, and proved to be quite costly in both human and financial terms. Gamma initially reacted to Squibb's announcement by investing heavily in ACE inhibitor work. The company had earlier achieved some modest success working with the renin cascade, and was able to discover a plausible lead compound. However by 1982 it was clear that other companies had too long a lead, and that further investment in mechanism based hypertensive research would be counterproductive. Within hypertension, the firm refocused its attention on cardiotonics and anti-arrhythmic drugs, cardiovascular indications whose exploration would draw more heavily on the company's traditional strengths in synthetic chemistry and whole animal pharmacology. The history of the three firms is thus richly suggestive of the ways in which integrative capabilities have evolved within the industry.
Alpha
Alpha was founded before the second world war, and quickly established a reputation as an unusually "academic" pharmaceutical company. The founder announced his intention to hire scientists who were "every bit as good as those in academia," and he encouraged both publication and the presentation of results outside the firm. As a result the firm early developed a reputation for scientific excellence, and was able to hire unusually "academic"
scientists. In an era when biologists were often second class citizens at pharmaceutical firms, Alpha maintained both an institute devoted to fundamental biological research and an unusually active and productive pharmacological research department run by a scientist of national reputation. When at first it proved difficult to recruit a biologist of suitable calibre to run the research institute, Alpha did not hesitate to recruit an outstanding candidate from
Europe. This concern with scientific excellence and a commitment to publication and open communication across the scientific community has remained a hallmark of the company. This firm's early scientific orientation is evident in the history of the hypertensive research program. Alpha introduced its first important hypertensive drug in the forties, and by the late fifties had a successful diuretics research program under way. In both cases, although much of the research had been of the traditional "screen and modify" variety, Alpha's scientists had been guided in their research by a knowledge of the physiological mechanisms of hypertension. In the sixties the firm invested heavily in the screening and exploratory synthesis of diuretics and vasodilators, but they also made a major breakthrough in the treatment of hypertension through their continued exploration of centrally acting agents. A small group of researchers acting on the then current theory of the effects of the central nervous system on hypertension synthesized a compound whose action they could confirm "in vitro," or in the test tube, but whose effect they had great difficulty demonstrating "in vivo." However they continued to be curious about its effects, sharing samples with clinical colleagues and discussing its properties at scientific conferences. Once a number of experts working in the public sector had demonstrated its potency, Alpha brought the compound to market and it became a successful treatment for hypertension.
In the late sixties and early seventies Alpha continued to invest heavily in hypertensive research, focusing particularly on research in vasodilators and beta blockers.
The firm's concern for mechanism and the belief that better science could lead to improved discovery is particularly well illustrated by the company's approach to the discovery and development of beta blockers. The first beta blocker was discovered by Sir James Black and his partners working at ICI in the early seventies (Black, 1989 ). It was a major breakthrough in the treatment of hypertension and both Alpha and many of its rivals moved quickly to exploit the discovery by searching for other compounds that would also reduce blood pressure by acting as competitive antagonists at the heart's beta receptors. Then disaster struck. One of the beta blockers then under development by ICI -(practolol) -was shown to cause mammary tumors in rats. The FDA suspected that this effect was characteristic of the class and refused to approve further drugs in the class. Alpha, like many other firms, was tempted to abandon beta blocker research. But scientists in safety assessment -the group that runs animal safety studies within the firm -believed that practolol's problems might well be a function of aspects of the compound that were not related to its beta blocking activity.
They were able to persuade senior management of their theory and through some skillful science were able to demonstrate its validity. Alpha's beta blocker was brought successfully to market and the way was cleared for the further development of the class.
In 1974 a small group began to explore inhibition of the renin angiotensive system, attempting explicitly to find a compound that would inhibit the synthesis of the angiotensive converting enzyme. Their work was given further support by the advent of "Dr A." as the new manager of discovery research. Dr A. was a successful academic who joined Alpha convinced of the value of mechanism driven research, and the ACE inhibitor work was formally constituted as the "Enzyme Inhibitor Design Project." Thus when Cushman and Ondetti's critical paper was published, Alpha already had a substantial cross-disciplinary effort with two years of experience in place. The group were thus able to move quickly to exploit the discovery, combining creative chemistry with a deep understanding of the factors that drive duration and efficacy, and were able to discover another ACE inhibitor that has proven to be quite successful in the market. The firm today is widely recognized as one of the leaders in mechanism based research, and continues to search for novel therapies that might control hypertension.
Beta
Early success in antibiotic research gave Beta a steady stream of revenue that funded an active, scientifically focused research group from the late fifties onwards. In the early days neither senior nor operating management exercised much control over research. Senior scientists were free to pursue any project of their own choosing, and even newly entering researchers were exhilarated by the freedom that they experienced. There was little competition between scientists, not much pressure to publish and very little interference from management. "It was like a family" one later recalled: "a utopia" another remembered.
Unfortunately the group was not productive. Despite the discovery of a number of promising compounds on a wide range of fronts, between 1962 and 1976 the group was unable to get a single drug discovered within the lab to market. Senior management turned increasingly to the in-licensing of compounds as a solution, seeking to leverage the sales and distribution network that had been developed to sell antibiotics through the release of additional drugs. They were quite successful, and although the company remained committed to funding internal research, the balance of power within the company shifted increasingly to the marketing group. Research was increasingly perceived as a service function, responsible for developing candidate compounds discovered by other firms, and perhaps partly as a result both clinical development and the management of the international business were not tightly linked to central research.
This focus took its toll on the research function. When a combination of insightful pharmacology and creative chemistry resulted in the discovery of a hypertensive agent with a promisingly distinct mode of action, senior management was slow to recognize its potential and the development of the drug was agonizingly slow, and when Cushman and Ondetti published their seminal paper there was only a single chemist with Beta who was following their work. He had earlier synthesized a possible AII blocker, but had been unable to interest senior management in its development. He read the Cushman and Ondetti paper with a mixture of admiration and chagrin.
By 1980 the increasing costs of the research function, in common with the dramatic successes obtained by some of their competitors convinced the senior management of the company to radically rethink their approach to research. In 1981 they promoted "Dr B." to the post of research director. Dr B. was a newly hired researcher fresh from a major university, and "an iconoclast," "an aggressive, dynamic and charismatic" man with an avowed commitment to mechanism based research. He immediately conducted an aggressive and intensely personal review of the company's research portfolio. The portfolio had been trimmed in 1977, following a reorganization that had linked the research function more tightly to the business, but several additional programs were discontinued. Dr B. began to hire aggressively from leading research universities, and he reorganized the research function into cross disciplinary groups that were tightly focused on well defined mechanism based targets.
Within hypertension, Dr B. gave additional resources and responsibility to a young chemist who had made some encouraging progress in exploiting the company's earlier discovery, and he initiated a major program to investigate the possibility of interrupting the renin angiotensive cascade in a quite novel way, hiring a promising young academic to lead the effort. Both programs were overtly mechanism based, and both were heavily funded over the next decade. The researchers were encouraged to publish and Beta gradually developed a significant reputation in the field as well as a number of promising lead compounds.
The transition was both painful and exhilarating. Looking back, many remembered it as a time when the resources committed to research greatly increased. In reality this was not the case, but it is symptomatic of the energy and enthusiasm that Dr B. was able to generate.
However his efforts to force Beta into a more mechanism based style of research ran into a number of obstacles. As he sought to link the company more closely to the wider scientific community, to encourage a richer flow of information across disciplines and classes within the firm and to change the ways in which resources were allocated, the history of the group threw up barriers that were both immediately obvious and somewhat more subtle.
The first problem was that of linking the company more closely to the wider scientific community. Dr B. believed that only about 20% of the research staff were of the calibre that would win tenure in a major research community, and while the company had made use of outside experts there was little history of active publication. He started to hire aggressively, but while several highly qualified individuals were excited by the challenge of building a modem research organization, others were dubious. Beta had no history of leading edge research, and some were doubtful that they would find the institutional commitment that they required. Dr B. encouraged key researchers to take academic sabbaticals -a revolutionary idea for Beta -and he actively supported publication, but since the company had had little experience handling the tension that publication placed on the organization it was some years before publication rates equalled those at Alpha.
Research was organized into mechanism focused teams, but cross disciplinary communication was nevertheless not without problems. In his desire to break with old ways of doing things, and in the hope of dislodging marketing from its once dominant role in research, Dr A excluded marketing representatives from the teams. This decision came back to haunt the company when some of the drugs that were later brought to market were found to be inadequately distinguished from existing products. While communication between the traditional disciplines of synthetic chemistry and pharmacology was close and tight, it was some years before the subsidiary disciplines --process chemistry, formulation and toxicology --could be integrated successfully into the research process. Clinical development, for example, which had for years been managed as a quite separate function was only slowly integrated into research, and the international business continued to be organized quite distinctly.
Perhaps the most difficult problems arose in the allocation of resources within research. Dr B. had an abrasive personal style, and seemed to place little value on the history and achievements of the lab. He insisted on making the important decisions himself, III sometimes with little explanation. The group became increasingly polarized: "many people hated his guts" several researchers later recalled. In 1984 he was replaced. In the next six years the lab had three directors, evolving slowly to the less confrontational, more peer dominated method of resource allocation that our quantitative results suggested was associated with greater productivity. They were able to develop very high levels of trust within the decision making group by leveraging the norms of peer reviewed science to undergird the process. Individuals on the committee respected each other's scientific standing, and it became a vital forum for the exchange of information across the firm. Any department arguing for more resources did so by making a strong scientific case to the committee: this in turn alerted others within the firm to the nature and significance of the science within the department. While the use of the therapeutic area teams that had been introduced earlier reinforced the transfer of information across functions, the use of a committee to allocate resources ensured that information was transferred across therapeutic areas. By 1992 Beta had made the full transition to mechanism based research, but the ten years before had been harrowing ones, and while several interesting compounds are now being tested in humans, it is still too early to say if the transition will boost the productivity of the lab.
Gamma
Gamma entered the ethical drug business in the thirties, when the company's founders decided to institute a comprehensive screening program. They were fortunate. Of the first two hundred and sixty compounds that they screened, four came to market and one, an antibiotic, was extremely successful. For the next forty years Gamma continued to screen compounds for activity, focusing particularly on the extrapolation of their initial success.
In 1972 they found a novel hypertensive agent, but although the compound was brought to market it was not aggressively exploited. The company was organized by function, rather than by therapeutic area, and since the only common interaction was between the synthetic chemists and the pharmacologists there were no formally constituted teams. The compound's discoverer, a chemist, knew enough pharmacology to be able to speculate as to its mode of action, but at the time the company employed no molecular biologists or biochemists, and no effort was organized around the mode of action per se. The success of the early screening efforts, coupled with some small successes in the seventies and a senior management group whose background was not in pharmaceutical research led the company to continue to rely on whole animal screening as a primary methodology of drug discovery until the late seventies.
By 1978 the company had acquired a reputation as having "lots of good people but a great deal of bad luck," and Cushman and Ondetti's discovery, with its implicit promise of the power of mechanism based research, was one of the events that led to a reexamination of Gamma's approach to research. A decision was made to focus on three therapeutic areas, each of which was to be "science based." Anti-infectives and hypertension were chosen as two of the three areas, and research began on the renin angiotensive cascade.
By 1981 a promising candidate had been found, but in 1982 there was a dramatic change in the composition of the senior management group. The new management were determined to transform Gamma into one of the leading firms in the industry, and announced that they would only support research in areas in which Gamma could plausibly hope to be either first or second to market. The hypertensive program was discontinued, and the scientists involved shifted their attention to work on cardiotonics and arrhythmia. Both were fields in which Gamma's core skills in whole animal pharmacology and creative synthesis could be exploited, since the mechanisms behind both conditions were only poorly understood, and whole animal models remained the most effective way to search for new therapies. Moreover one of the company's existing drugs showed some promise as an arrhythmia agent, and thus the firm had a promising lead compound. Several specialists in disciplines such as electrophysiology were hired, but the firm although some exciting progress was made in understanding the fundamental mechanisms of arrhythmia, within the cardiovascular area Gamma essentially continued its strategy of screening and modifying as it searched for new agents.
Thus by the late eighties Gamma had still not entirely developed the capabilities associated with higher performance in a mechanism based regime. Although senior management were beginning to reward scientists for publication, many of the key scientific staff were not major figures in their respective disciplines at the national level. Resource allocation remained very much a "top down" process, with senior management consulting key scientists but continuing to make the key decisions, and there were few cross functional teams in place. In the early nineties the firm decided to expand and upgrade its research capabilities dramatically, and as of this writing the company is actively moving to make the transition.
Analysis
The case studies thus highlight both how complex any particular "integrative competence" is in practice, and how their development is contingent on a number of factors that evolve only slowly over time.
Consider, for example, the degree to which the firm is integrated into the wider biomedical community, proxied in our quantitative analysis by the variable "PROPUB," or by whether the firm promoted key scientific personnel on the basis of their standing in the scientific community. Promotional policies would seem to be a relatively malleable variable that can be easily manipulated by senior management, and if it alone ensured a firm's close connection to the scientific community, it seems surprising that there should be substantial variation in the variable across the firms in the our sample. But the three cases make it clear how difficult it is to move a firm from an internally focused orientation to one that is more focused on research conducted outside the firm. At Beta, for example, an announced policy of hiring "first rate" scientists had two unexpected effects. In the first place it alienated a lot of the existing staff. In the second place it was several years before it was relatively straightforward to recruit nationally regarded scientists. At Alpha, in contrast, while in the early days Alpha's penchant for hiring academics was viewed by others in the industry as something of an extravagance, as the importance of leading edge science increased and it became increasingly important to be able to conduct such science in house, Alpha's track record in hiring world class scientists and in giving them the freedom to publish made it quite straightforward to recruit the best available candidates. Thus a simple change in promotional policies does not create a "competence." It may be tightly correlated with the presence of such a competence, but it is not, in itself, sufficient to create it.
Similarly connection to the scientific community is not, in itself, sufficient to ensure a successful discovery effort. Indeed a couple of the firms in our sample at one stage maintained discovery efforts that were extraordinarily productive in the sense that they generated a great deal of interesting science, but that singularly failed to produce any new drugs. While the scientists at these firms were rewarded for being at the leading edge of their disciplines, they were not closely connected to each other or to the ultimate marketplace.
Individuals often felt a strong sense of mission, but in the absence of the organizational or cultural mechanisms to connect their research with that performed by other specialists, their work was more often than not exploited by competitors. Leading edge science can be done on a disciplinary basis: but leading edge drug discovery requires the integration of knowledge across a wide range of complex disciplines. In our quantitative work we captured this particular integrative competence with the variables "TEAM" and "FUNC." Firms that were organized by therapeutic area, or that used some form of integrative team appeared to be significantly more productive than those that were organized by discipline alone.
Here again the cases suggest that this competence is more complex than the simple announcement of an organizational change. Alpha, for example, never moved to formally constituted teams, yet maintained a comprehensive flow of information across disciplinary boundaries. This flow seems to have been maintained by a culture that placed great value on medical advances, and by a culture of mutual respect that was fostered by the early practice of hiring nationally respected scientists into every discipline, not just medicinal chemistry. At Beta, in contrast, an early use of teams proved dysfunctional when marketing came to wield too much power in the organization and may have delayed the development of really effective cross functional ties, while at Gamma the dominance of the medicinal chemists and a history of success in a quite different mode of research made it difficult to build effective teams.
The cases also hint at the complexity inherent in the analytical significance of our variable "DICTATOR." Both Dr A. and Dr B. were men of strong personalities and strong beliefs, and both played a major role in the allocation of resources to research. Dr A. was very successful, but Dr B's experience hints at why it might be the case that in general leaving these decisions in the hands of a single individual is not always associated with success. Dr B. alienated many of his staff. Although arguably he made a number of good decisions, his style divided the research group, and made it difficult to maintain the kinds of close working relationships which underlie rich interdisciplinary communication. At Gamma, resource allocation was viewed as a matter of choosing promising markets, rather than of stimulating cross disciplinary communication, so that as a result the resource allocation process did not become a central locus of information exchange. Of the three firms presented here, only the Beta of more recent years moved to the kinds of peer dominated "high conflict" resource allocation processes that our quantitative analysis would suggest can be so successful. And they were only able to do so, it appears, once they had a scientific staff in place who were sufficiently identified with the academic culture that the use of a peer reviewed method of resource allocation seemed both natural and feasible. Several of the other firms in the sample also use this method, and it only appears to be feasible if the key individuals have both sufficient standing in the larger community to command the respect of their peers and sufficient scientific expertise to be able to discuss activities elsewhere within the firm credibly. Thus successful resource allocation committee appear to evolve simultaneously with the other capabilities fundamental to successful "rational" or mechanism driven research.
V. Discussion
As research in a variety of other industries has suggested, "integrative competencies,"
or the ability to integrate knowledge across both firm and disciplinary boundaries, play a crucial role in shaping success in pharmaceutical research. The results presented here suggests, however, that although these competencies may be readily identifiable in the sense that simple indicator variables such as the use of teams or a particular set of promotional policies may be indicative of their presence, they are in reality complex entities that evolve slowly over time. Thus they suggest that it may be difficult to develop normative prescriptions from cross sectional analyses of competence. For while the adoption and development of many of the crucial competencies that I have described here were under managerial control in the sense that they resulted from managerial actions, in many cases they resulted from the accumulation of many small decisions taken over many years in situations of great uncertainty. Moreover although all three firms proved to be malleable, in all three cases the initial beliefs and experiences of the firm shaped its later actions. At Alpha an early orientation to science laid the foundation for great success as biomedical research became increasingly central to the process of drug discovery, while at Gamma early successes with the processes of "random" drug discovery made it difficult to adopt a more "rational" orientation as the environment changed.
These results thus have relevance to our understanding of models of both industry and firm evolution, as well as to our understanding of "competence" and its role in competition.
They also raise a number of unanswered questions. One is that of the relationship between the broader environment of the firm and the development of competence. Several researchers have suggested that the structure of competition inside an industry may shape competence, and this is clearly an important arena for future research. But the case examples presented here suggest that the institutional structure of the industry may also play an important role in shaping competence development. It may be the case, for example, that the size and vitality of the public research establishment makes it possible to use an individual's standing in the rank hierarchy of the industry as a signal of individual quality, so that a promotional policy that stresses standing in the public community both ensures a rich flow of information across the boundaries of the firm and serves to attract the best possible people (Zucker, 1987) .
Similarly the fact that many of the majority of the scientists engaged in the research effort have extensive experience in academic settings in which norms of data based confrontation are the rule may be a necessary condition for peer dominated committees to be an effective too for either resource allocation or for stimulating rich interdisciplinary communication.
This research also raises broader issues about the relationship between the nature of the technical task faced by a firm and the nature of competence. Preliminary work leads me to believe that the availability of a drug's "mechanism of action" as an integrative tool has a profound effect on organizational structure and on the nature of communication across groups within the firm. I am actively exploring this issue in ongoing research. 
Data and Methodology
In order to explore these issues I rely on both qualitative and quantitative data drawn from a larger study of research productivity in the pharmaceutical industry. Data were obtained from public sources and from ten major pharmaceutical firms. The ten cover the range of major R&D-performing pharmaceutical manufacturers, and they include both American and European manufacturers. In aggregate, the firms in the quantitative sample account for approximately 25-30% of worldwide R&D and sales, and I believe that they are not markedly unrepresentative of the industry in terms of size, or of technical and commercial performance. The quantitative study draws upon data about spending and output at the research program level. Full details of the quantitative data are given in our paper "Measuring Competence? Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry," (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) . The qualitative data draws upon a program of detailed field interviews conducted at the ten firms in combination with the extensive study of secondary sources.
Pharmaceutical technology is enormously complex. Thus I attempted both to develop a general understanding of the history of research and development in the industry and to focus in detail on the scientific and technical history of the development of cardiovascular drugs. Cardiovascular drugs were chosen as the focus of the study for several reasons. They are one of the largest and most rapidly growing classes of drugs, and every firm in the sample had undertaken some cardiovascular research. Moreover the class includes both extraordinarily powerful agents whose mechanism of action -the precise biochemical means whereby the drug has a physiological effect -is well understood, and less effective agents that have been used for many years and whose precise mechanism of action has not been fully elucidated. It is thus a class that is likely to be representative of the range of research undertaken by a firm.
The study drew extensively on secondary sources including the national press, reference texts, academic textbooks, medical journal articles and reports by both consultants and the Office of Technology Assessment. In addition, at nine of the ten firms that contributed quantitative data to the study I was able to develop a broad understanding of how research had been managed within the firm by interviewing three to four key individuals, including the chief research scientist or his or her equivalent. These interviews were semistructured in that each respondent had been provided with a list of key questions before the interview, and each interview lasted from one to three hours. In four of these nine firms I was also able to interview a further four or five key individuals who had an in-depth knowledge of the history of cardiovascular drug development inside the firm. The senior manager of cardiovascular drug discovery was always a member of this group.
In the remaining five of the nine, I was able to construct a much more detailed history by interviewing a much wider range of individuals, from the senior manager of research to project leaders, bench chemists and pharmacologists intimately involved with particular projects. These interviews were also semi-structured, and lasted from forty five minutes to an hour and a half. In each case, the goal of the interview was to develop a narrative history of cardiovascular drug development at each company as it was experienced by the informant. These data were supplemented by interviews with a number of industry experts, including senior academics in the field. In all, over one hundred individuals were interviewed. 
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